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In re Estate of Wilson: Judicial
Reformation of Discriminatory Charitable
Trusts
I. Introduction
With few exceptions, every person has the right to dispose
of his property as he chooses.' But any action the state takes to
implement this right must not contravene the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution.' In a consolidated opinion, in In re Estate of Wilson,3
the New York Court of Appeals held that judicial reformation of
a discriminatory charitable trust was not action attributable to
the state under the fourteenth amendment. In both cases, gen-
der-restricted scholarships were established by testamentary
1. See In re Estate of Johnson, 93 A.D.2d 1, 20, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932, 944 (2d Dep't)
(Niehoff, J., dissenting) rev'd sub nom. In re Estate of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452
N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983). See also In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa.
434, 441, 138 A.2d 844, 847 cert. denied sub noma. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 357
U.S. 570 (1957); United States Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 202 Or. 530, 275 P.2d 860, 864
(1954).
In certain instances, a person's freedom to dispose of his property may be limited by
statutory or case law prohibitions. An example of a statutory limitation is a statute pro-
viding for a right of election by a surviving spouse; such a statute permits a surviving
spouse to choose between taking the amount provided in the will, if any, or taking the
"forced share" amount provided by the statute. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST
LAW § 5-1.1(c)(1)(B) (McKinney 1981) (A surviving spouse has the right to elect to take
one-third of the net estate if the decedent is survived by one or more issue; in all other
cases, the elective share is one-half of the net estate.). Moreover, a person may not dis-
pose of his property to achieve an immoral or illegal purpose, or violate public policy.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Hutchins , 147 Misc. 462, 464, 263 N.Y.S. 896, 898 (Sur. Ct.
Montgomery County 1933) (A condition in a will providing that the decedent's daughter
could have the income from a trust fund only if she lived separate and apart from her
husband was void as against public policy because it encouraged the breaking up of the
family.).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I states in part: "No State shall . .. deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
3. 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983). The court of appeals




trusts,4 and school board participation was required to select
scholarship recipients.5 In Wilson, the appellate court had used
its cy pres power to eliminate participation by the school board.'
In In re Estate of Johnson,7 the companion case, the Surrogate
had replaced the school board with a private trustee.8
The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that the Surro-
gates were merely applying neutral trust principles and that the
trusts' discriminatory terms could not be fairly attributed to the
state.9 Although the decision stated that courts must not en-
courage, affirmatively promote, or compel discrimination, 0 Wil-
son may signal an increase in the degree of action a New York
court may take before the equal protection clause is implicated.
Part II of this Note discusses the state action concept, with
particular emphasis on judicial enforcement and reformation. It
also examines the court's cy pres power and the countervailing
constitutional principles governing an individual's freedom to
discriminate in the disposition of his property. Part III presents
the parallel factual backgrounds of the cases and the opinions of
the surrogate's court, the appellate division, and the court of ap-
peals. Part IV analyzes the reasoning of the court of appeals de-
cision in the context of relevant constitutional and trust princi-
ples. Finally, Part V concludes that judicial modification that
permits continuation of the discriminatory scheme of a private
charitable trust is unconstitutional state action under the four-
teenth amendment.
4. Id. at 468, 452 N.E.2d at 1231, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 903. The Wilson trust provided
that income "be applied to defraying the education and other expenses of the first year
at college of five (5) young men who shall have graduated from the Canastota High
School." Id. at 469, 452 N.E.2d at 1231, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 903. The Johnson trust provided
that income be used "for scholarships or grants for bright or deserving young men who
have graduated from the High School of [The Croton-Harmon Union Free] School Dis-
trict. Id. at 470, 452 N.E.2d at 1231, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
5. Id. at 469-70, 452 N.E.2d at 1231, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
6. In re Estate of Wilson, 87 A.D.2d 98, 101, 451 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (3d Dep't 1982),
aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (1983).
7. In re Estate of Johnson, 108 Misc.2d 1066, 439 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sur. Ct. Westches-
ter County 1981), rev'd, 93 A.D.2d 1, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932, rev'd sub nom. In re Estate of
Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983).
8. Id. at 1073, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
9. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 468, 452 N.E.2d at 1231, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
10. Id. at 479-80, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
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II. Background
A. State Action - Generally
The state action concept is derived from the fourteenth
amendment, which states in part that "no state shall. . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."" A state can deny equal protection of the laws by acting
through its legislature, 12 its executive,1 3 or its judicial authori-
ties. 4 The equal protection proscription of the fourteenth
amendment applies only to action by the states." Discrimina-
tory conduct by private citizens is not forbidden."
Historically, state action was defined as that action taken in
the name of the state, and for the state, which was clothed in
the state's power.' 7 Throughout the maze of state action litiga-
tion, the Supreme Court has refrained from establishing a for-
mal test to identify state action.' s Debate has flourished over the
extent and the nature of the action that constitutes forbidden
state action.'9 Individual cases have been decided on their indi-
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880).
13. Id.
14. Id. (A judge who restricted jury service to whites in contravention of a congres-
sional act violated equal protection guarantees.). See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313,
318 (1880).
15. See generally Note, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1065, 1069-72 (1969) (discussion of the types of state action necessary to invoke the
equal protection clause). See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Bolling ex-
tended the equal protection requirements imposed on the states to the federal govern-
ment by using a new interpretation of the fifth amendment due process clause. Twenty
years later the Court stated that its "approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection
claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Four-
teenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). For a gen-
eral discussion of the application of equal protection principles to discriminatory action
by the federal government, see Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Pro-
tection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977).
16. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). These cases establish the require-
ment that state action is necessary to enable a person to bring a claim under the four-
teenth amendment.
17. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 347.
18. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
19. See generally Barnett, What Is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fif-
teenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution? 24 OR. L. REV. 227 (1945)
(Acts of public officers are "state" action only when officers act under state authority or
under "color or pretense" of law.); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action 60 COLuM. L.
REV. 1083 (1960) (Court must give shape to state action concept by considering the
3
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vidual facts; the search for state action has involved "sifting
facts and weighing circumstances. '20 In essence, the discrimina-
tory conduct must be "fairly attributable to the state."'"
Principal state action theories that have survived include
the public function doctrine,22 the state involvement theory,23
the state encouragement theory,2 ' and the judicial enforcement
doctrine.2 5 The Supreme Court has found state action under the
public function doctrine when a private individual performs a
public function that is ordinarily performed by the state.2 6 State
involvement occurs when the rights of a private party are vio-
lated by another private party in a situation in which the viola-
tion is attributable to the state.2 7 The Court has found state en-
problems presented in each case; a rigid formula ignoring the facts should not be used.);
Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957) (State action is present when the state gives legal
effect to transactions between private persons.); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961) (Strict formula for ascertaining state action should be avoided;
facts for each case should be "sifted and weighed."); Williams, The Twilight of State
Action, TEX. L. REV. 347 (1963) (State action analysis should be superseded by analysis
to determine whether the state's constitutional interest in eliminating .discrimination is
outweighed by a private right to personal discrimination.).
20. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
21. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
22. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
23. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
24. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
25. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
26. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (Streets of a privately owned company
town were equated with city streets, and the town's owner was prohibited from banning
freedom of expression in the streets.). See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (A
private park which had formerly been a public park providing "municipal" type services
maintained its municipal character, and therefore could not exclude blacks.); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (A private political association that conducted primary elec-
tions could not exclude blacks because the elections were considered a public function).
In the 1970's, the Court limited the public function doctrine to those functions that
were traditionally performed exclusively by the government. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (Supplying utility service was not traditionally
an exclusive state function.); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (Ware-
houseman's sale of stored goods in satisfaction of a lien he obtained under state law was
not state action because the resolution of private disputes was traditionally not an exclu-
sively governmental function.).
27. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (State
parking authority was recognized as a joint participant in discrimination because it
leased space in one of its buildings to a coffee shop that refused to serve blacks.).
State involvement may be direct, such as when a law is enacted mandating segrega-
tion. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1963). The state involvement
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/6
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couragement of private discrimination in a state constitutional
provision that repealed existing state laws banning discrimina-
tion.2" Finally, judicial enforcement of private discrimination oc-
curs when an individual is deprived of a right because a court
has used its power to enforce private discriminatory behavior.2 9
B. Judicial Enforcement as State Action
1. Shelley v. Kraemer
When the Supreme Court decided Shelley v. Kraemer"0 in
1948, it confirmed the principle that actions of state courts and
of judges acting in their official capacities constitute state ac-
tion.3' In Shelley, a restrictive covenant among a group of white
homeowners forbade any of them from selling their homes to
"any person not of the Caucasian race." 2 Shelley, a Negro, pur-
chased a piece of the restricted property.3 Owners of other
property subject to the restrictive covenant brought suit, seeking
to restrain Shelley from taking possession and seeking to divest
can also be indirect, such as when private citizens caused Negroes to be arrested by
falsifying reports that the Negroes had committed crimes. United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966). State involvement includes state responsibility, which follows
from "state participation through any arrangement, management, funds or property."
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). If a standard exists, it is probably that the con-
duct, which is presumably causing the infringement of a federal right, must be "fairly
attributable to the state." Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. at 937.
28. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (The ultimate effect of the state consti-
tutional provision was that it permitted or encouraged private individuals to discrimi-
nate in the sale or lease of their property.). See also Griffen v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130
(1964) (A private park employee was appointed as deputy sheriff so that he could arrest
black trespassers in a private amusement park.); Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970) (State custom of not offering restaurant service to racially mixed groups was en-
couraged by police harassment of a patron who deviated from the custom.); Griffen v.
County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (State granted financial aid to racially dis-
criminatory private schools.). But cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
In Moose Lodge, the mere grant of a liquor license to a private club that discriminates
was not a state action. Id. at 177. If, however, the state had required the lodge's compli-
ance with discriminatory provisions in its own by-laws, state action would have been
present.). Id. at 178-79.
29. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also infra notes 30-41 and
accompanying text.
30. 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
31. Id. at 14.




him of title.3 4
The Supreme Court concluded that because there was no
constitutional bar to private discrimination, the covenant itself
violated no constitutionally guaranteed freedom. 5 But the Court
held that judicial enforcement of private discriminatory agree-
ments was forbidden by the fourteenth amendment." The Court
noted that freedom from discrimination by the states in the en-
joyment of property rights is a major objective of the fourteenth
amendment37 and reasoned that the equal protection clause may
be invoked when court enforcement of the covenant is sought. 8
The Court further observed that the fourteenth amendment is
not rendered ineffective "simply because the particular pattern
of discrimination, which the state has enforced, was defined ini-
tially by the terms of a private agreement. State action . . . for
the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to the exer-
tion of state power in all its forms."3 9 The state court's action in
Shelley was not a case of simple abstention that would have left
private citizens free to practice private discrimination." If not
for the active intervention of the state courts, Shelley would
have been free to purchase his property without restraint."
The Supreme Court applied the Shelley rationale in Bar-
rows v. Jackson.42 In Barrows, the Court held that judicial en-
forcement is impermissible state action when a state court
34. Id. at 6. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court denied the relief sought
on the ground that the restrictive covenant had never become final. (At the time the
covenant was made, it was the parties' intention that the covenant not become effective
until all property owners in the district signed. This never happened.) Id.
Sitting en banc, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court and directed
that the relief sought by the covenantors be granted. The court held that the covenant
was effective and that its enforcement was constitutional. Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo.
814, 198 S.W.2d 679 (1946).
35. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 13.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 20. For a discussion of the countervailing constitutional rights of liberty
and equality in Shelley, see Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion
110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962).
39. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 20. If, on the other hand, the purpose of the
covenants were effectuated by voluntary adherence, there would have been no action by
the state, and the fourteenth amendment would not have been violated. Id. at 13.
40. Id. at 19.
41. Id.




awards damages against a landowner who breaches a racially re-
strictive real estate covenant.4" The Court reasoned that when
damages are awarded, the continued enforcement of the cove-
nant is no longer a matter of individual action.44 The award
against the breaching covenantor rendered non-Caucasions una-
ble to purchase and own property on the same terms as Cauca-
sians and deprived them of equal protection of the laws in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment.45 The Court concluded that
the Constitution grants no individual the right to demand action
by the state that results in the denial of equal protection of the
law to other individuals.4 '
2. The Girard Will Case
In Pennsylvania v. Brown, 7 a case factually similar to In re
Estate of Johnson,8 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a state court's substitution of private trustees for state
trustees who were legally unable to administer a school for "poor
white male orphans" was unconstitutional state action.49 The
court based its decision on Shelley and concluded that state in-
volvement was the obvious net consequence of substituting the
trustees.50
Brown was the culmination of more than a decade of litiga-
tion stemming from the Girard Will Case."'
43. Id. at 254. The parties were owners of residential real estate in the same neigh-
borhood in Los Angeles, California. Their covenant stated that the property should never
be used or occupied by non-Caucasians. The covenant was to run with the land and the
restrictions were to be incorporated in all transfer papers. Respondent broke the cove-
nant (1) by conveying her real estate without incorporating the restriction in the deed
and (2) by allowing non-Caucasians to move in and occupy the premises. Id. at 251-52.
44. Id. at 254.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 260 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 22).
47. 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
48. 108 Misc. 2d 1066, 439 N.Y.S. 2d 250 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1981), rev'd,
93 A.D.2d 1, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932 (2d Dep't), rev'd sub nom. In re Estate of Wilson, 59
N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983).
49. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d at 120.
50. Id. at 124-25.
51. Girard Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. County 1955), aff'd, 386
Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956), rev'd sub nom., Pennyslvania v. Board of Directors, 353
U.S. 230 (1957). In his will, Stephen Girard left a large sum of money in trust to the city
of Philadelphia to establish a school for "poor white male orphans." Id. at 675. In 1869, a
local board of trusts was established to administer the school. Id. at 678. In 1954, two
1985]
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Previously, in 1957, the United States Supreme Court held
that the administration of a discriminatory trust by a state
agency is unconstitutional even when the discrimination is pur-
suant to a private bequest.5 2 Thus, the Court concluded that the
administration of the Girard trust was unconstitutional because
the trustee was a state agency and the refusal to admit two boys
was based on race. 3
On remand, the orphans' court replaced the state agency
with a private trustee.54 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of the court's replacement, concluding
that an individual has a right to have his lawful bequest judi-
cially respected and enforced.5 The court further concluded
that Shelley was distinguishable because (1) blacks had no right
to be beneficiaries under the Girard will,56 and (2) replacement
was appropriate as it would be in any situation in which a trus-
tee could no longer serve.5 7
The black children then instituted a federal class action.5 8
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in
otherwise qualified black children were refused admission to the school because of the
bequest's racial restriction. The boys petitioned the orphans' court for an order directing
the Board to admit them, arguing that their exclusion because of race violated the four-
teenth amendment. The orphans' court rejected the constitutional argument and refused
to order the applicants' admission. Id. at 719-21. For discussions of the Girard litigation,
see Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephan
Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957); Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 213 (1956).
52. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
53. Id. at 231.
54. Girard Estate, 7 Pa. Fiduc. 552, 558-59 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. County 1957). After
the Supreme Court decision, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute granting the
orphans' court the power and duty to appoint substitute trustees for the property of
minors when a previous trustee which was a political subdivision was removed "in the
public interest." Act of Nov. 19, 1959, No. 538, 1959 Pa. Laws 1526.
55. Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied sub nom.
Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
56. Id. at 451, 138 A.2d at 851.
57. Id. at 455, 138 A.2d at 853.
58. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), afl'd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968). The black children claimed that their continued
exclusion from Girard College by the newly appointed trustees was constitutionally im-
permissible. The class action was initially brought by seven black male orphans suing on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. They were joined by the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, and the city of
Philadelphia. The defendants were the newly appointed trustees of the Girard Estate.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/6
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upholding the children's claim. 9 A concurring opinion stated
that by choosing to remove the Board of Trusts as trustee, the
orphans' court "significantly involved itself with invidious dis-
crimination"60 and brought itself within the Shelley doctrine.6
59. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968), aff'g 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D.
Pa. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968). The district court upheld the boys' claim,
reasoning that the immediate transfer of the trusteeship to private individuals by the
orphans' court failed to effectively disassociate the state from the discrimination prac-
ticed when the state operated the school. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. at 790.
60. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d at 127 (Kalodner, J., concurring) (quoting Reit-
man v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967). On invidious discrimination, the Supreme
Court has said that to examine the constitutionality of a state act the reviewing court
must (1) consider the act "in terms of its immediate objective, its ultimate effect and its
historical context and the conditions existing prior to its enactment" and (2) "assess the
potential impact of official action in determining whether the State has significantly in-
volved itself with invidious discriminations." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373, 380
(1967).
61. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d at 127 (Kalodner, J., concurring).
In the wake of Shelley and Brown, state courts have continued to find impermissible
state action where there has been judicial involvement with private racial discrimination,
including the judicial supervision and enforcement of a discriminatory charitable trust.
In re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574, 583 (Del. Ch. 1970); Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler, 301
A.2d 534, 536 (Del. Ch. 1973); Bank of Delaware v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710, 715 (Del. Ch.
1969). A federal court has refused to instruct trustees to implement discriminatory provi-
sions of a racially restricted trust because the advice was held to be the equivalent of
judicial state action. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 687
(E.D. La. 1962). Courts, however, have not readily extended the Shelley judicial enforce-
ment doctrine to the gender discrimination context. See United States Jaycees v. Phila-
delphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 1981); Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp.,
530 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976). Although courts have indi-
cated that state action would be present if a substantial relationship existed between
court enforcement and private sex discrimination, they have declined to find a substan-
tial relationship in circumstances in which a court's only participation involved providing
a disinterested forum. See United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d at
145 (finding no substantial relationship between court enforcement of the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act and gender discriminatory practices of the national organization even
though the local chapter's charter was terminated by the national organization for viola-
tion of the national's discriminatory practices); Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530
F.2d at 69 (holding a court judgment enforcing a lease provision that was gender neutral
on its face was not substantially related to purported gender discrimination).
The United States Supreme Court has stated that state action exists when the state
courts apply a rule of law, whether statutory or not, to award a judgment in a civil ac-
tion. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (Action was attributable
to state court only after it had rendered a final judgment on the merits of a libel suit.).
But see Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 444 F.2d 1300, 1309 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1019 (1972) (no state action on part of state court merely because private civil tort
action was filed); Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 908
(1963) (no state action in civil litigation where state court did no more than furnish a
forum and had no interest in outcome). The Court has also found state action in a case
9
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C. Cy Pres
1. Generally
Cy pres, which literally means "as near,"" is a judicial
mechanism for the preservation of charitable trusts, which per-
mits a court to revise a charitable trust in order to meet unfore-
seen emergencies or changed circumstances that threaten the
trust's existence.6 3 For a court to use its cy pres power, a settlor
must have manifested a general charitable intent. 4 General
charitable intent is present when there is evidence that although
the settlor intended that his property be applied to a specific
charitable purpose, he had a more general intention to devote
that property to charitable purposes. 5 If there is evidence of a
general charitable intent and if the settlor's original purpose be-
comes impossible, impracticable, or illegal, a court uses its cy
pres power to reform trust provisions so that the settlor's chari-
table intent may be implemented as closely as possible.6 Thus,
where state courts enforced state common law policy. Cf. American Fed'n of Labor v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (Judicial enforcement of common law policy restraining
peaceful picketing interfered with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
discussion.).
Other courts have concluded that state action occurs when a state court grants an
injunction, see Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1969), and when a judi-
cial preference is substituted for a testator's intent in a will construction proceeding. In
re Will of Hoffman, 53 A.D.2d 55, 66, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 56 (lst Dep't 1976) (construing
the word "issue" to exclude illegitimate children).
62. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 431 (rev. 2d ed. 1977). Historically, cy pres
was used by the King of England as parens patriae to direct trust property toward
whatever charitable purpose he chose. Adams, Racial and Religious Discrimination in
Charitable Trusts: A Current Analysis of Constitutional and Trust Law Solutions, 25
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 23 (1976). It was the king's prerogative to use cy pres arbitrarily. Id.
He had no duty to ascertain a charitable purpose that was in accord with the donor's
original intent. Id. The concept of judicial cy pres developed concurrently and was used
in cases in which there was a blanket gift to charity. Id. at 23-24. Early American case
law accepted judicial cy pres. Id. at 24.
63. Weaver Trust, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 245, 250 (1967). See generally G. BOGERT, supra
note 62, §§ 431-442; IV A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 395-401 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959); E. FISCH, THE Cv PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1950).
64. A. SCOTT, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 399 (1960).
65. Id.
66. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 35 Del Ch. 449,
454, 121 A.2d 296, 299 (1956) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959));
In re Will of Lee, 3 Misc. 2d 1072, 1079, 156 N.Y.S.2d 813, 822 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County
1956).
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state courts have used cy pres to eliminate discrimination in
charitable trusts that violated the fourteenth amendment be-
cause state action was required to accomplish the trust's pur-
poses. 67 Courts have deleted discriminatory restrictions regard-
ing race, 8  religion,69  national origin,70  and sex.7 '  It is
Cy pres may be used to apply a trust corpus to a charitable purpose that satisfies
the settlor's general charitable intent. In re Will of Shatford, 18 Misc. 2d 953, 188
N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sur. Ct. Columbia County 1959) (Where testator had manifested general
charitable intent to benefit the town, the court used cy pres to authorize building an
indoor swimming pool because funds left by testator Were insufficient to build a park and
an outdoor pool as specified in the will.); In re Will of Hendricks, 1 Misc. 2d 904, 148
N.Y.S.2d 245, (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1955), aff'd., 3 A.D.2d 890, 161 N.Y.S.2d 855
(4th Dep't 1957), aff'd. 4 N.Y.2d 744, 148 N.E.2d 911, 171 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1958) (Where
testator had manifested general charitable intent to benefit medical and surgical re-
search but the private university to which the funds had been endowed determined that
it was no longer economically feasible to continue operation, the court used cy pres to
authorize payment of trust income to the state university that acquired the private med-
ical school.). But see In re Will of Heffron, 3 N.Y.2d 665, 148 N.E.2d 671, 171 N.Y.S.2d
545 (1958) (Cy pres doctrine held inapplicable where private medical school conveyed its
facilities to state university, and testator had made clear his intention to benefit human-
ity exclusively through the private medical school.).
67. See In re Crichfield Trust, 177 N.J. Super. 258, 426 A.2d 88 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1980); In re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970); Dunbar v. Board of Trustees,
170 Colo. 327, 461 P.2d 28 (1969).
68. See, e.g., Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). In Fitz-
Gerald a trust was established to create a home for aged white men. The court deleted
the word white, calling it an unenforceable word. Id. at 725; See also Coffee v. Rice
University, 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). In Coffee, the court determined, at the
request of the trustees, that the donor's primary intent was to create a greater center of
learning. When it became convinced that this was not possible so long as the discrimina-
tion remained, the court used cy pres to eliminate a founder's racial restriction on Uni-
versity admissions. Id. at 286.
69. See, e.g., Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961). In Howard,
the court used cy pres to eliminate the Protestant-Gentile restriction for scholarship
recipients, thereby giving effect to the testator's primary intent to benefit Amherst Col-
lege. Id. at 509-10, 170 A.2d at 47-48.
70. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hawley, 32 Misc. 2d 624, 223 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sur. Ct.,
N.Y. County 1961). In Hawley, the court used cy pres to excise the conditions that prize
recipients at the Trinity School in New York be Protestants "in good standing" and sons
of native-born Americans. The student body had changed over time. Since there was no
longer a significant number of applicants who met the original religious and national
origin requirements, the court reasoned that the testator's primary intent was to benefit
the school. Id. at 628, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
71. See, e.g., In re Crichfield Trust, 177 N.J. Super. 258, 426 A.2d 88 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1980). In Crichfield, the trust was originally for the benefit of "worthy boys of Sum-
mit High School." The court applied cy pres and eliminated the sex-based classification,
reasoning that it was adapting to circumstances unforeseen by the testatrix when the
trust was established in 1932. At that time few female graduates went to college and the
11
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unnecessary that the precise terms of the trust become illegal or
impossible to implement; courts have used cy pres even in cir-
cumstances in which the testator's precise instructions were
merely impracticable.72
In contrast, if the settlor manifested no general charitable
intent, the trust fails if its original purpose becomes illegal, im-
possible, or impracticable. 73 Cy pres is inapplicable in these situ-
ations.74 Cy pres may not be used to vary the terms of a bequest
merely to suit the desire or convenience of the trustee.7 5 Nor
may it be used when the testator has provided for a gift-over7 6
to other charitable purposes to take effect upon a finding that
testatrix probably predicted neither the change in the number of women seeking higher
education nor the growth of public policy against sex discrimination. Id. at 261-62, 426
A.2d at 89-90. See also Long Estate, 5 Pa. D. & C.3d 602, 618 (1978). In Long, a trust for
"respectable white women" discriminated on the basis of sex and race. The court
changed the words "white women" to "persons." But see In re Will of Cram, 186 Mont.
37, 44-45, 606 P.2d 145, 150 (1980) (eliminating public organizations from participation
in the mechanics of a gender discriminatory trust, instead of eliminating the gender
restriction).
72. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Board of Trustees, 170 Colo. 327, 334, 461 P.2d 28, 32
(1969). (Charitable intent of testator whose 1899 will established a school for the care
and training of poor, white, male orphans, aged six through ten, was best served by ex-
tending admission to children regardless of color, aged six through eighteen, who were
deprived of parental care or support.); cf. Lutheran Hosp. v. Goldstein, 182 Misc. 913, 46
N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944) (Testatrix's charitable intent that income, but
not principal, be used to provide free hospital beds for the poor at Lutheran Hospital of
Manhattan was best served by donating trust income to another hospital, which was
financially sound, instead of invading corpus to support the financially troubled Lu-
theran Hospital.).
73. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). Senator Bacon had provided for a city-
run park to be used exclusively by whites. In his will, he had mentioned his belief that
whites and blacks should not mix for recreational purposes. The Georgia court held that
because the park could no longer be operated on a segregated basis, the trust had failed
and the property should revert to Senator Bacon's heirs. Id. at 447. See also LaFond v.
Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959) (Trust was permitted to fail where testa-
trix had provided for a "playfield for white children" and the will stated that it "be
carried out to the letter.").
74. See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). (Cy pres held inapplicable be-
cause the racial restriction was an essential, inseparable part of Senator Bacon's plan).
75. See Connecticut College v. United States, 276 F.2d 491, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Testatrix bequeathed funds to United States Military Academy for construction of a
memorial building in a certain location. The Academy wanted to put the building
elsewhere. The court reasoned that the Academy's refusal to apply the funds as pre-
scribed by the testator was not due to circumstances beyond the Academy's control.
76. A gift-over is an alternative bequest that takes effect if a trust is unable to
operate, or if, by its terms, a trust violates the law. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v.
Johnson Memorial Hosp., 30 Conn. Supp. 1, 9, 294 A.2d 586, 591 (Super. Ct. 1972).
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the trust violates the law.7 The provision for a gift-over negates
the existence of a general charitable intent just as the absence of
such a provision is evidence of a general charitable intent.78
2. Cy pres Distinguished from Deviation
Cy pres differs from deviation, a closely related equitable
principle that permits a variation of trust terms in circum-
stances in which the trust would otherwise be defeated or seri-
ously impaired.7 9 The cy pres power, which is exercisable only
by the court, allows a shift to a similar charitable purpose or a
change in the class of beneficiaries.80 Deviation authorizes a
court to grant trustees the power to make changes in a trust's
administration, but not changes in its purposes or
beneficiaries. 81
It is a state court's responsibility to decide whether cy pres
or deviation should be applied to any particular charitable
trust.2 There is no discernible pattern to predict whether a state
court will apply cy pres to a given discriminatory trust
provision.
3. Cy Pres and Discriminatory Scholarships
State courts have generally used their cy pres power to de-
lete discriminatory provisions in charitable trusts establishing
scholarships in situations in which effectuation of a trust became
77. Id.
78. See G. BOGERT supra note 62, § 437 (rev. 2d ed. 1977).
79. See Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson Memorial Hosp., 30 Conn. Supp.
at 9, 294 A.2d at 591. See generally IV A. ScoTT, supra note 63, § 381; RESTATEMENT
supra note 63, § 381.
80. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson Memorial Hosp., 30 Conn. Supp. at 9,
294 A.2d at 591.
81. Id. Deviation did not authorize elimination of bequest's racial restriction to cau-
casions because it did not permit enlarging the class of beneficiaries to include persons
the testatrix intended to exclude. Id. Because the testatrix provided for a gift-over to her
residuary estate in the event that the trust became inoperable, the court declined to find
general charitable intent and held that cy pres was inapplicable. The trust was allowed
to fail. Id. See also Bank of Delaware v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710, 715 (Del. Ch. 1969)
(Court used deviation to instruct trustee and scholarship committee consisting of the
high school principal, the Chief Justice of the State and a bank president to accept
scholarship applications from nonwhites.).




impossible.8 3 In Connecticut, the supreme court removed racial
and gender restrictions from a scholarship trust, but left reli-
gious restrictions intact.8 4 The court reasoned that the testator
had manifested more concern with the religious restrictions than
with the racial or gender restrictions.8 The dissent argued that
by removing only two of the three discriminatory restrictions the
court had clearly involved the state in sanctioning and enforcing
private discrimination."
In Massachusetts, the supreme judicial court ordered a pri-
vate bank acting as the trustee of a public charitable trust to
accept applications for law school scholarships without regard to
gender restrictions.87 The court reasoned that the testator, who
directed that the fund "be used to aid ...worthy and ambi-
tious young men to acquire a legal education,"88 had used the
word "men" in its generic sense, which included women. 9
The Delaware Courts of Chancery have deleted racial re-
strictions from scholarship trusts.9 0 In Bank of Delaware v.
Buckson,9' the court refused to advise the trustee to reject appli-
cations from nonwhites because it concluded that this advice
was tantamount to state enforced discrimination.2 In addition,
the court found state action because the committee to evaluate
the scholarship applicants consisted of state officials.93
83. See Adams, Racial and Religious Discrimination in Charitable Trusts: A Cur-
rent Analysis of Constitutional and Trust Solutions, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 13-19
(1976).
84. Lockwood v. Killian, 179 Conn. 62, 425 A.2d 909 (1979).
85. Id. at 69, 425 A.2d at 913.
86. Id. at 73, 425 A.2d at 914 (Bogdanski, J., dissenting).
87. See Ebitz v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 372 Mass. 207, 361 N.E. 2d 225 (1977).
88. Id. at 209, 361 N.E.2d at 226.
89. Id. at 211, 361 N.E.2d at 227.
90. Bank of Delaware v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710 (Del Ch. 1969); Milford Trust Co. v.
Stabler, 301 A.2d 534 (Del. Ch. 1973). For a similar treatment in federal court, see Wa-
chovia Bank v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
91. 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969).
92. Id. at 715. In Buckson a testamentary trust established in 1917 provided for an
annual college scholarship to be awarded to a white male graduate of Wilmington High
School. The testator expressed a general concern for the well being, prosperity and sta-
bility of the Wilmington community. Id. at 711-12.
93. Id. at 717. The court noted that since the will had been drafted, circumstances
had changed substantially, with an enormous shift in the schools' racial population. Id.
at 714. See also Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler, 301 A.2d 534 (Del. Ch. 1973) (The court
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Most recently, a New Jersey appellate court eliminated a
gender-based restriction on a scholarship trust that had been
administered by the local board of education for fifty years.9 4
The court concluded that it had become impossible for the
board to administer the trust because restrictive provisions vio-
lated the board's policies against discrimination. 5
In contrast, some state courts have declined to use cy pres
in similar circumstances because they found no unconstitutional
state action.'6 The Missouri Supreme Court held that no state
action was involved when the testator established a sex-re-
stricted scholarship at a university which was private at the time
the trust was established, but which subsequently became part
of the state university.17 The court concluded that although the
university was involved in the administration of the private
trust, the university's involvement was not so pervasive or ex-
tensive as to constitute state action.' The court relied on the
fact that the private trustee had the ultimate power of
selection."
Similarly, a district court in Pennsylvania found cy pres in-
applicable when a racially restrictive scholarship trust required
college officials to certify the eligibility of applicants to a private
found unlawful state action in the administration of a racially restrictive scholarship
trust because the selection committee consisted of persons who held positions in state
educational administration and the committee received information from the school dis-
trict through its principals and teachers.).
94. In re Crichfield Trust, 177 N.J. Super. 258, 426 A.2d 88 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1980).
95. Id. at 261-62, 426 A.2d at 89-90.
96. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank, 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979).
97. Id. at 320.
98. Id. According to the court, the university merely participated in the selection
process by disseminating information about the scholarship in its catalog, accepting and
processing applications in its financial aid office, determining academic standards and
financial needs, making "tentative awards," and forwarding names of qualified male stu-
dents to the private trustees who, in turn, had the final power to select scholarship recip-
ients. Id.
99. Id. at 321. A dissent argued that for all practical purposes the university was
selecting the scholarship recipients, and therefore, the selections were state action. Id. at
323 (Simeone, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Simeone would not have used cy
pres to substitute the neutral word "students" for the word "boy," rather, he would have
applied the doctrine of deviation to remove the university from its participation in the
scholarship's administration. Id. at 323-24.
15
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trustee. 00 The college petitioned for removal of the racial re-
striction, which was contrary to its policy.' 0' The court declined
to delete the racial restriction because the "white" eligibility cri-
terion could be literally and lawfully carried out without certifi-
cation by the college officials.'2
D. Countervailing Principles: Freedom to Discriminate vs.
Equal Protection
Balanced against the fourteenth amendment's equal protec-
tion guarantees are the constitutionally protected countervailing
rights of liberty and privacy."0 3 Included among these protected
rights is the freedom to discriminate, which "the Constitution
prefers over the victim's claim to equality, and which the state
may be constitutionally permitted - if not required - to sup-
port by judicial remedy."'0 ° In Shelley v. Kraemer,"°5 the Su-
preme Court addressed the question of whether judicial enforce-
ment of a private discriminatory agreement constituted state
action. The Court concluded that although there was no pro-
scription against the covenant itself, any court action required
for enforcement was impermissible state action.' 6
The protected freedom to discriminate includes the right of
an individual to bequeath his property to whomever he
chooses. 07 But the right to discriminate in the free disposition
of one's property is less than absolute. 08 It is well settled that
courts will not administer testamentary provisions designed to
further immoral or illegal purposes. 0 9 Moreover, the right to
100. Weaver Trust, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 245 (1967).
101. Id. at 247.
102. Id. at 254.
103. See Henkin, supra note 38, at 487 (1962). The facts in Shelley clearly illustrate
these countervailing rights. The Shelleys sought equality to take possession of property
and enjoy home ownership to the same extent as others without regard to racial
prejudice. The Kraemers sought liberty to contract freely and thus choose their neigh-
bors. Id. at 488.
104. Id.
105. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
106. Id. at 13-14.
107. In re Estate of Johnson, 93 A.D.2d at 9, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., In re Hughes, 225 A.D. 29, 30-31, 232 N.Y.S. 84, 86 (4th Dep't 1928),




dispose of property in a discriminatory manner may not enlist
substantial state participation. 110
Bequest cases present a particularly difficult problem be-
cause no will can be probated, and thus given effect, without
court action. If a probate court's actions in probating a will were
attributable to the state as state action no discriminatory testa-
mentary bequest could ever be effectuated. Because discrimina-
tory provisions are commonly present in testamentary schemes,
a testator's right to dispose of his property according to his
wishes would be severely impaired, if not abrogated."' In each
case, the question that must be answered is whether the state's
role provides sufficient sanction and encouragement to the pri-
vate discrimination to make the state responsible for that dis-
crimination." 2 Ministerial or neutral acts, such as probating a
will or substituting one private trustee for another, do not con-
stitute state action for equal protection purposes."' A ministe-
rial act is one that is performed in accordance with uniform pro-
cedures and involves no discretion on the part of the person
performing it." 4 Moreover, a ministerial act may be performed
by a judge or by clerical personnel." 5 But when a judge or other
employee exercises his discretion, the act is no longer a ministe-
rial act; it becomes instead a judicial or quasi-judicial act."'
III. The Cases
A. In re Estate of Wilson
Clark Wilson's will provided that his residuary estate be
held in trust with the income applied each year toward de-
fraying the first year college expenses of five "young men" who
graduated from Canastota High School. 17 The will required the
superintendent of the school district to certify the candidates'
110. In re Estate of Johnson, 93 A.D.2d at 9, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
111. See Henkin, supra note 38, at 499-500.
112. Id. at 499.
113. See In re Estate of Johnson, 93 A.D.2d at 15, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 942.




117. In re Estate of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 469, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1231, 465




grades to the trustee bank. " 8
In 1981, after the Wilson trust had been administered with-
out incident for eleven years, " 9 the Civil Rights Office of the
United States Department of Education received a complaint al-
leging that the superintendent's certification of the candidates'
grades violated title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972,
which prohibits gender discrimination in any educational pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance."' To
avoid the potential loss of federal funds and the possibility of
prosecution for violation of title IX, the school district agreed to
refrain from further certification of student grades to the
trustee.
1 21
Unable to administer the trust, the trustee bank initiated a
proceeding in June, 1981 to determine the effect and validity of
the trust provisions under the will.1 22 The Surrogate ordered the
trustee to continue administration of the trust in all respects.12 3
The appellate division, third department, unanimously con-
cluded that the school district's voluntary refusal to certify the
students' names to the trustee rendered the administration of
the trust according to its literal terms impossible.1 24 The court
used its cy pres power to strike the clause in the will requiring
the superintendent's certification of the candidates, 5 and the
118. In re Estate of Wilson, 87 A.D.2d 98, 99, 451 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (3d Dep't 1982)
aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (1983). Three of the candidates were to have at-
tained the highest grades in science; the other two were to have attained the highest
grades in chemistry. Id. Wilson's will further provided that the number of high school
science awards should be reduced according to the number, if any, of Canastota gradu-
ates enrolled in accredited medical schools. Each enrolled medical student was to receive
an award that would otherwise have gone to a high school student. Id. It is interesting to
note that there was no gender restriction for the medical scholarships, which have been
awarded to both men and women. Record at 38, In re Estate of Wilson, 87 A.D.2d 98,
451 N.Y.S.2d 891 (3d Dep't 1982) (No. 42058).
119. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 469, 452 N.E.2d at 1231, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
120. Id. (citing Education Amendments of 1972, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982)).
121. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 469, 452 N.E.2d at 1231, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
122. Id.
123. In re Estate of Wilson, No. 81-21676 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Madison County Oct. 23,
1981). The court held that the school district's participation by providing grades to the
trustee was a purely ministerial function and did not give rise to a fourteenth amend-
ment violation. Id. at 19. The court further said that the language in the Wilson will was
clear and unambiguous, and required no judicial construction. Id. at 20.
124. In re Estate of Wilson, 87 A.D.2d at 101, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (3d Dep't 1982).




court substituted a provision that permitted qualified students
to apply directly to the trustee.12
B. In re Estate of Johnson
By a testamentary trust, Edwin Johnson created a gender
restricted scholarship fund to provide scholarships for "bright
and deserving young men who have graduated from the high
school of the [Croton-Harmon Union Free] School District, and
whose parents are financially unable to send them to college."' 2 7
The Croton-Harmon Board of Education was named as trustee.
With the assistance of the high school principal, the school
board was to select scholarship recipients. 2
Before any scholarships were awarded, a female student at
the high school claimed a right to scholarship eligibility. 2 The
National Organization of Women filed a complaint with the
Civil Rights Office of the United States Department of Educa-
tion addressing the scholarship's gender restrictions. 3 The
school board refrained from awarding any scholarships because
it did not want to jeopardize its receipt of federal funds, and the
executrix of Mr. Johnson's estate subsequently brought an ac-
counting proceeding in surrogate's court.13' The Attorney Gen-
eral of the State of New York, as statutory representative of the
indefinite and ultimate charitable beneficiaries, also petitioned
the court to delete the word "men" and substitute the word
"persons.'-32
The Surrogate ordered that the school board be replaced by
126. Id. Although the appellants urged the court to apply its cy pres power to elimi-
nate the gender restrictions in Mr. Wilson's will, the court reasoned that its power over
the disposition of other people's assets was limited to the removal of restrictions only if
they were inconsistent with the testator's dominant purpose. The appellate division reit-
erated that the court must use cy pres to carry out the testator's original purpose as
closely as possible.
127. In re Estate of Johnson, 108 Misc. 2d 1066, 1067, 439 N.Y.S.2d 250, 251 (Sur.
Ct. Westchester County 1981), rev'd, 93 A.D.2d 1, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932 (2d Dep't), rev'd sub
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a private trustee,133 because the board's unwillingness to admin-
ister the trust according to its terms rendered the trust impossi-
ble.134 Furthermore, the Surrogate specified that the private
trustee could consider recommendations made by the school
board or the high school principal. 135
A divided appellate division, second department, reversed
the surrogate's court and held that under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the court could not reform
a trust that by its own terms would deny equal protection of the
laws. 3 6 The court said that the Surrogate's substitution of a pri-
vate trustee was "inconsistent with the purposes and principles
of the fourteenth amendment.' 37 The appellate division used its
cy pres power to make the trust gender neutral.'38
The court distinguished the Surrogate's judicial reformation
in this case from the "largely ministerial and neutral judicial
acts" of probating a will containing a discriminatory bequest or
of substituting one private trustee for another private trustee to
administer a discriminatory trust. 39 The court characterized the
Surrogate's substitution of a private trustee as "breathing life"
into a discriminatory provision that was invalid at its inception
because of state involvement. 40 The appellate division cited evi-
dence that Mr. Johnson viewed the school district's role as es-
133. Id. at 1073, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
134. Id. The court cited Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 921 (1968), for the proposition that the mere supervision or appointment of
trustees by a probate court did not amount to prohibited state entanglement, because
there was abolutely no history of any direct state involvement. In re Estate of Johnson,
108 Misc. 2d at 1072, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 254. The Surrogate distinguished the facts in
Johnson from those in Brown and Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), where there
had been a long history of state and municipal involvement prior to the court's appoint-
ment of private trustees. Id.
135. In re Estate of Johnson, 108 Misc. 2d at 1073, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
136. In re Estate of Johnson, 93 A.D.2d 1, 15, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932, 942 (2d Dep't),
rev'd sub nom. In re Estate of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900
(1983).
137. Id. at 12, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 940. The appellate division said that although refor-
mation of the trust was appropriate, the Surrogate had used his power incorrectly by
substituting the private trustee. The preferable option would have been to delete the
gender restriction. Id. at 8-9, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
138. Id. at 16, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
139. Id. at 15, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 941-42.
140. Id. at 19, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
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sential to the selection process. 4 Finally, the court noted that
in the 1961 and 1974 versions of his will, Mr. Johnson attached
no gender restrictions to alternate scholarships to be awarded if
his specific bequests become impractical.' 42
C. The Court of Appeals Decision
1. The Majority
In a six to one decision, the court of appeals reversed the
appellate division in Johnson and unanimously affirmed the or-
der of the appellate division in Wilson.' 43 The court held that
judicial reformation of these trusts did not violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 44 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Cooke acknowledged that the court's ex-
ercise of its power over trusts could constitute state action
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, 45 but he em-
phasized that "a trust's discriminatory terms are not fairly at-
tributable to the State when a court applies trust principles that
permit private discrimination but do not encourage, affirma-
141. Id. at 16-17, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 942-43. The court said it was clear that the school
district's function was more than that of a mere conduit, because the school was in the
best position to select deserving recipients for the scholarships. Id. Without the school
district's recommendations, which the Surrogate had held permissible, the selection pro-
cess would be seriously impaired. Id. All of this essential activity would be unconstitu-
tional state action.
142. Id. at 17, 460 N.Y.S. 2d at 943. In contrast, the dissent found no unconstitu-
tional state action. Id. at 25, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 947 (Niehoff, J., dissenting). At worst, Mr.
Johnson had chosen an inappropriate trustee. Id. at 26, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 948. The dissent
viewed the majority's elimination of the gender restriction in Mr. Johnson's will as an
"unprecedented assault upon the freedom of every individual, man or woman ... to
dispose of his or her private property as he or she sees fit." Id. at 23-24, 460 N.Y.S.2d at
946. The crux of Justice Niehofts argument is that if a Surrogate can substitute one
private trustee for another to administer a discriminatory trust without being guilty of
unconstitutional state action, he should similarly be able to substitute a private trustee
for a public agency trustee without being guilty of unconstitutional state action. Id. at
26, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 948. The judicial action - the substitution of a trustee - is identical in
each case. In each case, the Surrogate assisted the testator by implementing his discrimi-
natory purpose. Id. at 27, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
143. In re Estate of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 46, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983),
afg 87 A.D.2d 98, 451 N.Y.S.2d 891 (3d Dep't 1982), rev'g sub nom. In re Estate of
Johnson, 93 A.D.2d 1, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932 (2d Dep't 1983). Chief Judge Cooke and Judges
Jasen, Jones, Wachtel, and Simons formed the majority; Judge Meyer dissented.




tively promote, or compel it. ' ' 4 "
The court reasoned that the accomplishment of the testa-
tors' specific charitable intent had not been rendered "impossi-
ble or impracticable.' '4 7 Provided the high schools graduated
male students, the testators' intent to provide for the educa-
tional expenses of male graduates could be fulfilled."48 The court
indicated that it was not exercising its cy pres power," 9 but
rather its general equitable power over all trusts to permit the
deviation from the administrative terms of the trust so that a
successor trustee could be appointed.'5 o According to New York
law, a testamentary trust will not fail for want of a trustee.''
After discussing the standards by which state action is mea-
sured and evaluated, Justice Cooke concluded that recourse to
the courts in Wilson was solely for the purpose of administering
the trusts and not for the enforcement of their discriminatory
provisions.152 The court stated that the replacement of the un-
willing trustee in Johnson and the deviation from the adminis-
trative trust term in Wilson were accomplished by court powers
that extended to all trusts. 153 The court action did not compel
discrimination.154 Furthermore, the state participation in the
trusts' administration was minimal and did not cause the trusts
to take on an "indelible public character.' ' 55
The court reiterated that the fourteenth amendment does
not mandate that the state exercise the full extent of its power
to eliminate all private discrimination. 56 The court concluded
that such discrimination falls within the ambit of the fourteenth
amendment only when the state itself discriminates, when it
compels another to discriminate, or when it allows another to
146. Id. at 479-80, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
147. Id. at 472, 452 N.E.2d at 1233, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 475, 452 N.E.2d at 1234, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
150. Id.
151. "[1]f no person is named as trustee, title vests in the court having jurisdiction
over the trust." N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1(a) (McKinney 1967). The court
may fill the vacancy. N.Y. SURR. CT. PRoc. ACT § 1502(1) (McKinney 1967).
152. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 479, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909.







discriminate while assuming a state function.1 57
2. The Dissent
Judge Meyer, dissenting in part, agreed with the majority in
affirming Wilson, but would also have affirmed the appellate di-
vision decision in Johnson.6 8 Judge Meyer observed that in
Wilson the trust was private and that the only public involve-
ment was the certification of student grades by the school super-
intendent. Because that information was available to the stu-
dents, there was no state action involved in the court's deletion
of the certification requirement.159 In Johnson, however, the dis-
criminatory trust had a public trustee, and this difference made
it unconstitutional state action for the court to legitimize the
trust by appointing a private trustee.160
IV. Analysis
In In re Estate of Wilson, the court of appeals concluded
that the elimination of the superintendent's certification in Wil-
son, and the substitution of a private trustee in Johnson did not
constitute unconstitutional state action, because in each case the
discrimination was not fairly attributable to the state. 61 Al-
though acknowledging that the court's exercise of its power over
trusts was subject to the fourteenth amendment's equal protec-
tion requirements, 6" the court of appeals maintained that the
modifications in these cases neither encouraged, affirmatively
promoted, nor compelled private discrimination. 63
The court of appeals attempted, but failed, to distinguish
adequately the actions it took in Wilson from the state court's
enforcement of the restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Krae-
mer.& The court observed that in Shelley it was not the neutral
regulation, but rather the court enforcement of contracts that
157. Id.
158. Id. at 480, 452 N.E.2d at 1238, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 910 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 480-81, 452 N.E.2d at 1238, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
160. Id. at 481, 452 N.E.2d at 1238, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
161. In re Estate of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 479, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1237, 465
N.Y.S.2d 900, 909 (1983).
162. Id..
163. Id. at 479-80, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909.




caused the discrimination to be attributable to the state. 6 5 In
Shelley, however, the Supreme Court noted that since the adop-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, the Court had consistently
held that the actions of state courts and state judicial officials
constituted state action within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment.'66 But without recourse to the courts for enforce-
ment in Shelley and for modification in Wilson, the private dis-
crimination could not be implemented.
The court of appeals stated that in Wilson the coercive
power of the state was never "enlisted to enforce private dis-
crimination." ' 7 Instead, the court's construction and reforma-
tion powers were used to interpret and modify the trust terms.1 8
The powers invoked and the trust principles applied extended to
all trusts, regardless of their purposes. 6 9
Similarly, the court of appeals failed to distinguish Penn-
sylvania v. Brown adequately.1 70 In Brown, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the state court's replacement of the
trustees, which allowed private discrimination to continue, was
unconstitutional state action.17 1 The New York Court of Appeals
maintained that the cases were distinguishable because the state
participation in Wilson before the trusts reached the courts for
construction was minimal compared with the state participation
in Brown.1 72 The court indicated that in Brown, the trust had
taken on an "indelible public character,' ' 73 presumably because
165. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 478, 452 N.E.2d at 1236, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
166. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 18.
167. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 479, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
168. Id. at 479-80, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
169. Id. There is no argument with the well-cited proposition that discrimination by
an otherwise private entity does not violate the equal protection clause simply because
the entity receives a service or benefit from the state, or because it is subject to state
regulation. If the rule were different, even a purely private entity would be unable to
exercise its freedom to discriminate, because every entity is subject to some form of state
regulation or is the recipient of some purely ministerial state service.
170. 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968). Brown addressed the
same issue as Johnson. In Brown, the state court substituted private trustees for state
trustees who were no longer legally permitted to carry out racially discriminatory provi-
sions as administrators of Girard College. Id. at 122. See supra notes 47-61 and accom-
panying text.
171. Id. at 120.





the state had administered the Girard College trust for more
than 125 years.7 But it is the character of the court action, not
the character of the trust that determines the existence of state
action in this context. The state courts' actions in Brown and
Johnson were identical. If judicial intervention, allowing a dis-
criminatory trust to continue, is unconstitutional state action in
one case, the same judicial intervention is unconstitutional state
action in the second case.
The court of appeals declined to use its cy pres power to
eliminate the gender restrictions in Wilson.15 The court con-
cluded that the gender restrictions of the trusts did not frustrate
the testators' paramount charitable purposes. 7 1 Instead, the
court used the equitable principle of deviation to alter the ad-
ministrative terms in Wilson and to appoint a successor trustee
in Johnson. 77
The court based its actions on its conclusion that the testa-
tors' primary intent was to finance a portion of the boys' college
educations and not to benefit the school districts directly. 78 But
the court offered no evidence to support its conclusion, and
there is at least some evidence in each case that the testators
intended to benefit the school districts. 79 Thus, it seems inap-
propriate for the court to attempt to distinguish Wilson from
cases in which state courts use cy pres to eliminate discrimina-
tory restrictions on scholarships to permit trusts to continue. 80
174. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d at 120.
175. Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 474, 452 N.E.2d at 1234, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 475, 452 N.E.2d at 1234, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
178. Id. at 474, 452 N.E.2d at 1234, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
179. In 1961, Mr. Johnson had executed a will leaving his residuary estate in trust
for Columbia University to be used for scholarships for young men from the Croton Har-
mon school district who attended Columbia. When Columbia expressed dissatisfaction,
Mr. Johnson's attorney replied that his client's interest in the school district was greater
than his interest in Columbia. Brief for the Attorney General-Respondent at 25, In re
Estate of Johnson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983). It is possi-
ble that the gender restriction in Mr. Johnson's will was the residual effect of a time
when Columbia was still all male. Mr. Wilson's will provided that medical school scholar-
ships for graduates of Canastota High School take precedence over college scholarships
for male graduates. The medical school scholarships had no gender restrictions. See
supra note 118.
180. See Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d at 474, 452 N.E.2d at 1234, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 906. The
court discussed Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961) and cited In




In each case cited, the state court found that the testator's pri-
mary intent was to benefit the educational institution."' Here,
given at least some evidence that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Johnson
intended to benefit the respective school districts, the cases
cited by the court of appeals seem analogous rather than
distinguishable.
The court further asserted that it was merely applying neu-
tral trust principles when it applied the doctrine of deviation in
Wilson. 82 Cy pres is also a neutral trust principle. The court
could easily have followed the apparent trend of other state
courts to use cy pres to eliminate the discriminatory gender re-
strictions. By choosing to apply the trust law that perpetuated,
rather than eliminated, the discrimination, the court in effect
placed its imprimatur on that discrimination.
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Johnson had the legal right to bequeath
their property with discriminatory provisions. But they could
not do so in a way that enlisted the substantial participation of
the state to accomplish their discriminatory purposes. The court
of appeals held that neither the judicial modification of the ad-
ministrative terms in Wilson nor the replacement of the trustee
in Johnson constituted substantial participation.1 83 Although
admitting a will to probate cannot be considered substantial
participation by the state because it involves largely ministerial
acts,1 84 neither the act in Wilson nor the act in Johnson was
merely ministerial. In each case, the judge used his discretion
and performed the distinctly judicial functions of construing the
testators' intent, and finding and applying the relevant law.
Thus, when a testator's intent is unclear and the state is in-
volved in the administration of a discriminatory trust, judicial
modification of the trust constitutes state action and arguably
violates the fourteenth amendment. Furthermore, "[t]he claim
that private discrimination is constitutionally protected must
give way to the no less legitimate claim that the state is consti-
tutionally prohibited from engaging in discriminatory conduct or
Coffee v. Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also supra notes 68-70.
181. Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. at 506, 170 A.2d at 45; In re Estate of
Hawley, 32 Misc. 2d at 624, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 804; Coffee v. Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d at 275.
182. See In re Wilson, 50 N.Y.2d at 480, 452 N.E.2d at 1237, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
183. Id.




encouraging private parties to discriminate."185
V. Conclusion
The New York Court of Appeals held in In re Estate of
Wilson,1 8 6 that judicial reformation of discriminatory charitable
trusts was not unconstitutional state action. By so holding, it
became the court's choice that the discriminatory trusts con-
tinue. Although the judicial reformation in Wilson neither com-
pelled nor affirmatively promoted private discrimination, it ap-
pears to have encouraged it by permitting its continuation.
The court's holding was more than neutral administration.
Future testators wishing to establish discriminatory charitable
trusts will assume, based on this decision, that when necessary,
the court will use its equitable powers to preserve discriminatory
provisions of a trust that fails because of state involvement.
There were sufficient facts in Wilson to justify the court's
use of cy pres to delete the gender restrictions. This action
would have signalled private philanthropists to scrupulously
avoid involving a public body in their discriminatory schemes.
But the court chose not to do this. Rather, it chose to apply
those trust principles that excised the public involvement and
allowed the discriminatory provisions to prevail. Judicial modifi-
cation that perpetuates a discriminatory scheme in a private
charitable trust is no less state action than judicial enforcement
of a private covenant.
Carla Driansky Glassman
185. Lockwood v. Killian, 179 Conn. 62, 75, 425 A.2d 909, 915 (1979) (Bogdanski, J.,
dissenting).
186. 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1983).
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